Criminal proceedings are to be tried within a reasonable time. This fundamental human right is catered for in Article 39 of the Constitution of Malta which reads as follows:
Whenever any person is charged with a criminal offence he shall, unless the charge is withdrawn, be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law.
This fundamental human right is also mirrored in Article (6)(1) of the First Schedule of the European Convention Act which lays down:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
The objective behind this human right is to ensure that the innocence or guilt of the person charged is determined in a speedily manner. Both the European Court of Human Rights and the Courts of Malta have introduced a number of criteria that need to be taken into consideration when determining whether there was or was not a breach of this right.
In Frydlender vs France, decided by the Grand Chamber on the 27th June 2000, it was stated that:
“the “reasonableness” of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute.”
This has also been reiterated and elaborated upon by the Maltese Constitutional Courts. In, Raymond Urry vs the Attorney General decided on the 27th February 2015 the Constitutional Court dissected these criteria further and included the following:
a. id-dewmien inordinatament twil u eccessiv;
b. in-natura kriminali tal-proceduri relevanti;
c. il-grad ta’ stat ta’ incertezza, frustrazzjoni, u ansjetà li d-dewmien necessarjament iggenera f’persuna akkuzata;
d. in-nuqqas tar-rikorrenti appellanti li jintraprendu xi inizjattiva biex jissolecitaw speditezza fl-andament tal-kawza taghhom;
e. il-kontribut tar-rikorrenti appellanti ghad-dewmien tal-proceduri
Naturally of course these criteria must be viewed within the context of the duration of the proceedings. No fixed time-limit has been set by any local or international legislation as to when criminal proceedings should be terminated. This is due to the fact that every criminal proceeding would have its own peculiar characteristics. To this effect, the Maltese Constitutional Court has noted in Police vs Patrick Pace decided on the 21st January 2023 that:
“t-test ta’ dewmien raġonevoli ma jidentifikax żmien speċifiku li fihom il-proċeduri kriminali għandhom jiġu konklużi, wisq anqas m’hemm ċirkostanza waħda partikolari li tiddetermina x’inhu raġonevoli. Iċ-ċirkostanzi kollha għandhom jittieħdu flimkien sabiex jiġi determinat jekk id-dewmien fil-proċeduri kinux raġonevoli o meno.”
In addition, another criterion has been discussed by the European Court of Human Rights and has been mentioned recently and briefly by the Maltese Constitutional Courts when determining the violation of this fundamental human right and this what is at stake in the proceedings for the applicant. In Buuhholz vs Germany decided on the 6th May 1981 the European Court held that the Court needs to take into account “what is at stake in the litigation for the plaintiff”. This consideration was also briefly highlighted also in the 2023 judgement of Police vs Patrick Pace wherein the Maltese Court considered “s-siwi ta’ dak li l-parti għandha x’titlef u tirbaħ mill-każ tagħha quddiem il-Qrati” to be the fourth criteria when assessing if there was a breach to be tried within a reasonable time.
In so far as the criterion dealing with what is at stake for the accused, reference may be made to the judgment of the Constitutional Court in the names of David Marinelli vs. Avukat Generali which stated:
“Din il-Qorti tifhem illi ghar-rigward tar-ragonevolezza tad-dewmien ghandha ssir distinzjoni bejn process kriminali u dak civili, ghax fejn il-liberta` jew il-gieh tal-persuna jkunu in issue, hu importanti li l-kwistjoni ma titwalx aktar milli hu necessarju, u filwaqt li fil-process civili, wiehed jista` jaccetta certu dewmien, dan m’ghandux ikun permess meta hemm imdendla kontra persuna akkuza ta’ natura kriminali. Ovvjament, kollox hu relattiv u kollox ghandu jitqies fil-kuntest tac-cirkostanzi partikolari tal-kaz li jistghu jwasslu ghar-ragonevolezza taz-zmien li ttiehed biex jigi determinat il-kaz in kwistjoni.”
By way of conclusion, one may say that although this right is clearly enshrined within the context of criminal proceedings, it is case-law which has moulded and is still moulding the elements of this fundamental human right. It also appears that these criteria continue to evolve and that whether or not there was a breach is something which is decided upon on a case-by-case basis.
